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Summary 
This paper investigates the economic incentives of countries to cooperate on international 
adaptation financing. Adaptation is generally implicitly incorporated in the climate change 
d a m a g e  f u n c t i o n s  a s  u s e d  i n  I n t e g r a t e d  A ssessment Models. We replace the implicit 
decision on adaptation with explicit adaptation in a multi-regional setting by using an 
adjusted RICE model. We show that making adaptation explicit will not affect the optimal 
mitigation path when adaptation is set at its optimal level. Sub-optimal adaptation will, 
however, change the optimal mitigation path. Furthermore this paper studies for different 
forms of cooperation what effects international adaptation transfers will have on (i) 
domestic adaptation and (ii) the optimal mitigation path. Adaptation transfers will fully 
crowd out domestic adaptation in a first best setting. Transfers will decrease overall 
mitigation in our numerical simulations. An analytical framework is used to analyse the 
most important mechanisms and a numerical model is used to assess the magnitude of 
effects. 
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This paper investigates the economic incentives of countries to cooperate on international 
adaptation financing. Adaptation is generally implicitly incorporated in the climate change 
damage functions as used in Integrated Assessment Models. We replace the implicit decision 
on adaptation with explicit adaptation in a multi-regional setting by using an adjusted RICE 
model. We show that making adaptation explicit will not affect the optimal mitigation path 
when adaptation is set at its optimal level. Sub-optimal adaptation will, however, change the 
optimal mitigation path. Furthermore this paper studies for different forms of cooperation 
what effects international adaptation transfers will have on (i) domestic adaptation and (ii) the 
optimal mitigation path. Adaptation transfers will fully crowd out domestic adaptation in a 
first best setting. Transfers will decrease overall mitigation in our numerical simulations. An 
analytical framework is used to analyse the most important mechanisms and a numerical 
model is used to assess the magnitude of effects.  
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1  Introduction 
 
Climate policy comprises both adaptation and mitigation. Mitigation abates climate change by 
reducing emissions or capturing carbon. Adaptation involves adjusting behaviour and 
infrastructure to better fit the new climate, thereby reducing the damages from climate change 
or increasing the benefits of climate change. To set optimal policies, Integrated Assessments 
Models (IAMs) have been developed to study the full cause and effect chain of climate 
change. In many such models, the damages of climate change are monetised and can be 
compared with the costs of mitigation options. Thus a cost-benefit approach can be applied to 
study climate change and formulate optimal climate change policies.  
The climate change damage functions used in these models, however, generally assume 
optimal adaptation and incorporate adaptation implicitly in the damage functions. This means 
that adaptation cannot be studied in itself as a decision variable, let alone in a suboptimal 
setting. To be able to better understand the role and importance of adapting, an economic 
assessment of the costs and benefits of adaptation, by making adaptation explicit in IAMs, is 
essential.  In this context, de Bruin et al. (2009a) have introduced the concept of an 
“adaptation cost curve”, that summarises the macroeconomic costs and impacts of adaptation 
efforts, and have subsequently adjusted the DICE model (Nordhaus and Boyer 2000), now 
called AD-DICE, to include an explicit adaptation choice variable. They find that when 
setting adaptation at its optimal level in the AD-DICE model, the results with respect to 
mitigation policies remain the same as in the original DICE model. This is obvious for the 
base case, as residual damage and adaptation costs are calibrated to the implicit optimum in 
DICE. However, the same result holds in sensitivity analyses (without re-calibration). That is, 
DICE’s implicit assumptions on adaptation do not bias its policy advice on mitigation. 
The DICE model is, however, a global model, with one benevolent leader maximising the 
utility of the globe. In a multiregional setting there are numerous players who can choose to 
cooperate on climate change (in different degrees) or to act solely in self interest. The first 
aim of this paper is to analyse whether the results of de Bruin et al. (2009a) are valid in a 
multi-regional setting with various forms of cooperation.  
Both the UNFCCC and IPCC WGIII TAR (IPCC, 2007) stress the role of financial transfers 
for the sake of mitigation as well as adaptation (e.g. in the form of an adaptation fund) as 
policy tools that can be used to build political support for international climate action. The 
topic of international adaptation financing, and which regions should receive funds from it 
and which should pay into it, has been discussed in recent literature (e.g. Burton et al. 2002, 
Bouwer and Aerts, 2006, Paavola and Adger, 2006; Dellink et al., 2009); Van Drunen et al. 
(2009) provide a systematic overview of existing and suggested financing mechanism. 
Especially in a policy setting adaptation funding has had a lot of attention, where it was an 
important topic of the recent UNFCCC meeting in Bali (UNFCCC, 2007) and an important 
point on the agenda for Copenhagen.  
Also the effects of monetary transfers on the incentives to join a coalition have been studied 
(e.g. Chander and Tulkens, 1997; Barrett, 2001; Carraro et al., 2006; Nagashima et al., 2009; 
Bosetti et al., 2009). Furthermore, transfers have been introduced into IAMs such as the 
EPPA model (Jacoby et al., 2004) in the form of financial transfers and in the RICE model in 
the form of technological transfers (Yang and Nordhaus, 2006). To our knowledge the only 
instance where adaptation transfers are considered in an IAM setting is in Hof et al. 
(forthcoming), which looks at the feasibility of financing adaptation needs in developing 
regions through a tax on Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) projects. The second aim of 
this paper is therefore to study what effects adaptation transfers will have on (i) domestic 
adaptation and (ii) the optimal mitigation path.  
To study our two objectives, we first present an analytical model of climate-economy 
interactions that focuses on the economic aspects of adaptation. We introduce adaptation costs 
and benefits in our model, and investigate the role that international financing of adaptation 
can play. Next, the AD-RICE model is presented, including its calibration to RICE. The   3 
numerical AD-RICE model is used to study the magnitude of the effects and to investigate 
questions that cannot be solved analytically. We look at three forms of cooperation; Nash (no 
cooperation), Climate cooperation (regional differences in climate change damages are 
considered) and Full cooperation (regional differences in income per capita are considered). 
We show for all forms of cooperation that when adaptation is assumed optimal, making 
adaptation implicit in the net damage function will not affect the mitigation results. We also 
show that if adaptation is not optimal, mitigation will be affected and adaptation and 
mitigation can compensate for suboptimal levels of each other. Note that we assume that 
adaptation efforts will only benefit the region where they are undertaken and there will be no 
spillover benefits or costs to other regions. Thus the optimal level of adaptation investments 
undertaken in a region by that region will not differ in the cooperative and non-cooperative 
case. We show that adaptation transfers will fully crowd out domestic adaptation expenditures 
in the equilibrium (where adaptation and mitigation are set at their optimal levels), but not 
necessarily when domestic adaptation is sub-optimal. Furthermore transfers will only take 
place in the cases of climate cooperation (running from low impact to high impact regions) 
and full cooperation (running from rich to poor regions). Our numerical model shows that 
emissions may increase slightly due to adaptation transfers.   
This paper is structured as follows. The second section describes the simplified integrated 
assessment model we use. The third section presents our propositions. The fourth section 
describes the calibration of our numerical model (AD-RICE) and studies the magnitude of the 
effects found in section three. The final section concludes. 
 
 
2  An explicit model of adaptation 
 
In this section we describe a simple integrated assessment model, where economic growth and 
climate change are linked. We first introduce a basic model with implicit adaptation. In this 
model there is one control variable, namely mitigation ( t j, m ). We then develop a second 
model which includes a damage function with explicit adaptation. When adaptation is explicit, 
gross damages can be reduced through adaptation efforts. In this model there are two control 
variables; mitigation ( t j, m ) and adaptation ( t j P , ).We extend this model further to be able to 
include international adaptation transfers.  
 
2.1  The basic model  
For simplicity, we assume that there are 2 regions, j=H,D, although the main conclusions can 
easily be extended to more regions. We furthermore assume, without loss of generality, that 
each region is of the same size in terms of population and that populations are constant over 
time. Moreover all parameters are non-zero. 
Regions produce output  , j t Y , which is given exogenously, causing emissions. Emissions are a 
linear function of output (with coefficient j W ). Emissions can be reduced through mitigation 
efforts ( t j, m ). Thus net emissions depend on both output and mitigation: 
, , , (1 ) j t j j t j t E Y m = W × - .  (1) 
Mitigation efforts come at a cost. The associated mitigation costs ( , j t MC ) are given as 
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j = × .                     (3) 
 
In our model output equals (national) income and regions can consume their output minus the 
sum of net damages of climate change and the costs of mitigation as follows: 
 
, , , , j t j t j t j t C Y D MC = - - .                  (4) 
 
 
Finally regional utility ( j U ) is derived from the discounted sum of consumption in each 
period over the planning horizon T  (as we have a constant population, this implicitly 
maximises consumption per capita).  Consumption is discounted over time using a discount 
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Maximising SWF involves choosing optimal values for the mitigation and adaptation levels, 
denoted by 
*
, j t m and
*
, j t P , respectively. Using different regional utility weights yields different 
solutions; this will be explored in more detail in Section 2.3. 
 
2.2  Adaptation 
We now introduce adaptation into our model. The damage equation (3) with implicit 
adaptation is replaced by the more elaborate system of equations (7)-(9) and income equation 
(11) replaces equation (4); the other equations remain unchanged.  
We assume gross damages ( t j GD , ), i.e. potential climate change damages without adapting, 
have a linear relationship to cumulative emissions: 
                                                 
1 Dellink et al. (forthcoming) show that a linear relationship is a reasonable approximation for this 









w = × .                    (7) 
Residual damages ( , j t RD ) are a function of adaptation ( t j P , ) and gross damages, where 
, 0 1 j t P £ £  represents the fraction by which gross damages are reduced: 
, , , (1 ) j t j t j t RD P GD = - × .                  (8) 
Equation (8) shows that regional adaptation  , j t P  will only decrease gross damages in the own 
region, i.e. we assume there are no spillovers (externalities) from adaptation to other regions. 











g g = × .                   (9) 
 
As the damage function in the base model implicitly assumed optimal adaptation
,
*
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º + , where the asterix indicates the optimal level. 
 
Consumption is still given as output minus all climate change costs: 
, , , , , j t j t j t j t j t C Y RD PC MC = - - - .              (11) 
 
 
2.3  Adaptation transfers 
 
We now introduce an adaptation fund to our model. Firstly we define region D as the donor 
region and region H  as the host region. An adaptation transfer is financed from the 
consumption function of the donor region. Hence for regionD we augment the income 
equation (11) and replace it by 
, , , , , D t D t D t D t D t t C Y RD PC MC TA = - - - - ,                       (12)
         
where  t TA  is the financial transfer for adaptation from region D to regionH . 
 
We assume that this transfer will solely be used for adaptation purposes in regionH . Hence 












= × .                           (13) 
A drawback of the simple utility function (5) is that utility increases linearly with the income 
level, and thus marginal utility is constant in income and consumption. This affects the 
analysis when comparing countries with different income levels. To be able to capture the 
differences in marginal utility across regions we replace the utility function in the base model 
with one that uses a log function over consumption. This entails that the marginal effect of 
consumption increases on utility are lower when consumption is high than when it is low. 
Equation (5) is replaced by 
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This model allows us to investigate 3 cooperation scenarios:  
i) Nash (no cooperation). In the uncooperative Nash case each region optimises its own utility 
taking the emissions of the other regions as given. The social welfare function weights are 




 yielding the competitive solution (Negishi 1960). In 
this case the shadow prices of capital in all regions are equalised and monetary transfers will 
not increase social welfare: any welfare increase from higher income in the host region will 
be matched exactly by an equivalent welfare loss in the donor region. 
ii) Climate cooperation: differences in climate change impacts are considered. In this case, 
the social welfare function weights are given by the inverse marginal utility of income before 




. In this case shadow prices are equalised 
when there are no damages from climate change.
 2 Monetary transfers will thus only be 
desirable from a social welfare perspective if damages among regions are unequal: 
compensation of damages in a high impact region by a low impact region will boost global 
welfare.  
iii) Full cooperation: differences in income are considered. In the case of full cooperation, all 
regions have the same welfare weight. In this case summed utility of all regions is maximised, 
shadow prices will only be equalised across countries if consumption levels are equal across 
countries and monetary transfers will increase social welfare if they flow from a high income 
region to a low income region (this depends on the assumption that marginal utility decreases 
in income levels). 
 
 
3  Adaptation-mitigation interactions and the role of 
adaptation financing 
 
In this section we shortly discuss the key analytical insights obtained from each of our model 
settings presented in Section 2. These insights are summarised in a series of propositions. The 
formal results are given in Appendix A (base model) and Appendix B (model with transfers) 
and proofs are given in Appendix C. 
 
3.1  Optimal levels of adaptation and mitigation 
 
First, solving our base model (as discussed in 2.1) using the Nash cooperation scenario, we 
can gain insights in the drivers of the control variables. The optimal level of mitigation with 
implicit adaptation equals
3: 
                                                 
2 This is because this weight will result in the competitive equilibrium in the case of no damages of 
climate change. 
3 Note that we assume that both regions experience positive gross damages from climate change, this is 
the case for most regions in the world, especially in the longer term. Some regions may, however, 
experience gross benefits from climate change. In our numerical AD-RICE model we include this 
possibility and model adaptation in such a way that it increases net gross benefits of climate change and 
decreases gross damages (see appendix). Here we focus on the case of gross damages, where 
adaptation can decrease gross damages to residual damages.  
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.                       (15) 
This result is intuitive: mitigation efforts increase as discounted value of future climate 
change damages increases ( , j j s s Y j r × × ) and as the production emission coefficient increases 
( j W ). Together, these two elements determine the effectiveness of mitigation through a 
stream of reduced damages. Furthermore, the level of mitigation effort decreases as the cost 
parameters of mitigation increase ( 2, , 1, , , j t j t q q ). 
Second, when including an explicit adaptation control variable (i.e. using the model with 
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.                            (16) 
The optimal level of adaptation thus increases when the gross damages increase ( j t M w × ) 
and decreases when the adaptation costs coefficients ( 2, 1, , j j g g ) increase. As with mitigation, 
higher damages, relative to the marginal adaptation costs, make adaptation more effective and 
hence increase its optimal level.   














j j s j s s j
s t















.                                (17) 
The intuition of these results remains unchanged: the level of mitigation effort decreases as 
the cost parameters of mitigation ( 2, , 1, , , j t j t q q ) increase and increases as discounted future 
climate change damages (
*
, , (1 ) j j s j s s Y P w r × × - × ) and the production emission coefficient 
( j W ) increase. What is new in equation (17) is that future benefits are now a function of 
adaptation levels. As future adaptation increases, the benefits of mitigation and thus the 
optimal level of mitigation decreases. 
 
3.2  Implicit versus explicit adaptation 
 
By comparing the model with explicit adaptation with the base model, we can investigate 
what effect making adaptation explicit will have. This is motivated from the fact that in most 
models of climate change adaptation is assumed implicit. When comparing explicit and 
implicit adaptation we only look at the Nash solution, i.e. we solve the optimisation problem 
for one region given the emissions of other regions. The results will hold for all scenarios 
given the regional characteristics of adaptation, i.e. the lack of international externalities.  
 
Proposition 1. Making adaption explicit in the optimum will have no effect on the optimal 
levels of mitigation.   8 
 
This proposition is based on the idea that once you assume that adaptation will be set at its 
optimal level in the future, you need not consider adaptation explicitly. This is because 
adaptation, when set at its optimal level, can be expressed exogenously and making it explicit 
will not change the optimal level of adaptation and thus also not the resulting mitigation level. 
Furthermore, adaptation is a flow variable only; and there are no externalities in adaptation. 
While, obviously, this proposition hinges on the assumption that implicit adaptation levels are 
optimal, it conveys an important policy message: mitigation results from Integrated 
Assessment Models that are based on an implicit treatment of adaptation, i.e. the vast majority 
of models presented in the literature and for instance in the IPCC assessments, cannot be 
deemed as biased in their mitigation recommendations. Where de Bruin et al. (2009a) stress 
this same result from a global perspective, Proposition 1 extends this to the multi-regional 
specification. 
 
3.3  Adaptation transfers 
 
To obtain insights in the role of adaptation transfers, we applied our model that includes 
transfers as introduced in Section 2.3.  
 
Proposition 2a. Foreign adaptation funding fully crowds out domestic adaptation 
expenditures in the optimum. 
 
When total adaptation expenditures (host and donor) in the host region are set at their 
domestic optimal levels, the host region will have no incentives to increase its level of 
adaptation. Any inflows of financing for adaptation will therefore crowd out host adaptation 
expenditures, as the funds can be spend more effectively on other activities. While this is a 
quite general result, there are potentially relevant feedback effects that are not present in our 
model. For instance, a higher consumption level will not imply higher emissions, and thus the 
additional resources can be used without distorting the climate system. 
 
Proposition 2b. Foreign adaptation funding is only effective (i.e. increases total adaptation 
efforts in the host region) if total adaptation expenditures (incl. received transfers) are below 
or equal to the domestic (host) optimum. 
 
Due to the absence of externalities of adaptation, i.e. adaptation benefits are only local; the 
host region will not have an incentive to increase the total level of adaptation expenditure in 
its region above the domestic optimal level. If the host region receives foreign adaptation 
funding, it will only not decrease its level of adaptation expenditures if the total level remains 
below or equal to the domestic (host) optimal level. It is easy to see that due to the local 
nature of adaptation this will be the case for all cooperation scenarios. 
 
Proposition 3a. Adaptation transfers will not take place in the competitive Nash equilibrium. 
 
This proposition is intuitive; as there are no international spillovers from adaptation back to 
the donor region, it will never have the incentive to fund adaptation expenditures in the host 
region when it acts solely in self interest. 
 
Proposition 3b. Adaptation transfers will be positive in the case of climate cooperation when 
the climate change impacts are higher in the host country than in the donor country. 
 
In the case of climate change cooperation, low impact regions want to compensate high 
impact regions. An adaptation transfer can give low impact regions a means of compensating 
high impact regions, thereby exploiting the higher welfare effect this transfer will have. Note   9 
that this transfer crowds out adaptation in the high impact region (proposition 2a). The 
transfer compensates the high impact region which is beneficial as it reduces damages and 
therefore also the need for emission reduction. 
 
Proposition 3c. Adaptation transfers will take place in the case of full cooperation when the 
level of consumption is lower in the host country than in the donor country. 
 
When global utility is maximised, due to decreasing marginal utility, high income regions will 
want to compensate low income regions. Through adaptation transfers they are able to do so. 
Thus global welfare will increase as transfers run from low marginal utility to high marginal 
utility regions. Note this transfer crowds out adaptation in the low income region (proposition 
2a). The transfer is used to compensate for differences in income. 
 
None of our cooperation scenarios fully reflect what is likely to happen in the real world. 
They do, however, reflect the three main motivations behind the behaviour of regions when 
cooperating on climate change. Firstly, regions naturally are concerned about their own 
wellbeing. This is reflected in the Nash scenario. Secondly, when regions cooperate 
concerning climate change, they will want to compensate those most affected by climate 
change, this is reflected in the climate cooperation scenario. Thirdly, regions also consider the 
level of income in regions when cooperating. Regions generally have some, though low, 
incentives to compensate low income regions. This is reflected in the full cooperation 
scenario. In a real world context, motivations will lie somewhere in between these three 
extremes and will also likely depend on a region’s historical responsibility in contributing to 
the climate change problem.   
 
The effect of transfers on mitigation is too complex to study analytically. To illustrate the 
complexity of the issue, we shortly discuss some of the mechanisms at work in relationship 
between adaptation transfers and mitigation levels. Consider the case of climate cooperation 
where funds are transferred to some high-impact region H  by a low-impact region D for the 
purpose of adaptation. Due to increased adaptation in regionH , region H  will have lower 
residual damages and thus more funds for other expenditures. Region H  can spend these 
funds on consumption or on mitigation, thereby decreasing emissions or invest in capital, 
which increases future production and thus also emissions.
 4 Region D now has fewer funds 
to invest in mitigation or capital but has a new mechanism by which to compensate region H  
for the effects of climate change. Thus region D can use adaptation transfers instead of 
mitigation to assist regionH , thus reducing the need for D to compensate for damages 
through a higher level of mitigation. Consequently, the social planner will trade-off the 
benefits and costs of mitigating versus financing adaptation. The final result of these various 
mechanisms is unclear a priori, and by applying our numerical model we can get a better 
understanding of the net result, which will be done in the next section. 
 
4  Numerical results 
 
The previous section provides several general insights using a simple model. We now apply 
our numerical AD-RICE model to gain insights into the magnitude of the mechanisms 
discussed in section 3 and to unravel secondary mechanisms that could not be studied 
analytically due to the large complexities involved. We first give a short description of the 
model and then discuss the results. 
 
                                                 
4 Note that such investment in capital is not present in our stylised analytical model.   10 
4.1   AD-RICE model 
 
The AD-RICE model incorporates adaptation into the RICE model
5, using the same method 
as employed in de Bruin et al. (2009a), i.e. by calibrating an adaptation cost curve that 
describes the marginal costs of adaptation efforts, analogous to a marginal abatement cost 
curve as often used for mitigation efforts. The full model is given in Appendix D, where the 
adaptation components are described in equations A.37-A.39. RICE is a regional version of 
the Dynamic Integrated Climate and Economy model. It consists of 13 regions: Japan, USA, 
Europe
6, Other High Income countries (OHI)
7, High Income Oil exporting regions (HIO)
8, 
Middle Income countries (MI)
9, Russia, Low-Middle income countries (LMI)
10, Eastern 
Europe (EE), Low Income countries (LI)
11, China, India and Africa
12.  
 
The AD-RICE model is calibrated such that it best replicates the results of the optimal control 
scenario of the original RICE model when adaptation is assumed to be at its optimal level 
throughout the model horizon. To this end regional adaptation cost curves are constructed 
such that the discounted squared difference between net damages ( , t j D ) in the original RICE 
and net damages ( , t j RD + , t j PC ) in AD-RICE is minimised. It is also assumed that adaptation 
is set at an optimal level at each point in time. We calibrate the parameters of the adaptation 
cost function and the gross damage function. The calibrated parameter values of AD-RICE 
are given in Appendix 2. Three regions (EE, OHI and Russia) have been excluded from the 
calibration procedure for the adaptation cost curves as they have very low, near zero, net 
benefits from climate change. For these regions we assume that no adaptation will take place 
as the impacts are so close to zero. Adaptation costs curves are drawn for the remaining 10 
regions in Figure 1, where the x-axis shows the level of adaptation as fraction of gross 
damages reduced and the y-axis shows the associated costs as a fraction of output. The line 
denominated as GLOBAL has been added and represents the AD-DICE2007 (de Bruin et al. 
2009b) global adaptation cost curve. As can be seen the adaptation costs in the different 
regions vary widely. Especially India, Africa and Low Income countries have high adaptation 
costs, whereas Japan, China and the USA have relatively low adaptation costs. 
                                                 
5 We use the RICE99 model as available online. 
6 Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Greenland, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, 
Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the 
United Kingdom 
7 Includes Australia, Canada, New Zealand, Singapore, Israel, and rich island states   
8 Includes Bahrain, Brunei, Kuwait, Libya, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and UAE. 
9 Includes Argentina, Brazil, Korea, and Malaysia.  
10 Includes Mexico, South Africa, Thailand, most Latin American states, and many Caribbean states. 
11 Includes Egypt, Indonesia, Iraq, Pakistan and many Asian states. 
12 Includes all sub Saharan African countries, except Namibia and South Africa   11 































































































































































Figure 1: Adaptation costs curves implicit in the RICE model. 
 
4.2  Explicit versus implicit adaptation 
 
Figure 2 shows the optimal emissions path for our three cooperation scenarios (Nash, 
climate cooperation and full cooperation) with optimal adaptation and without 
adaptation. When adaptation is not possible, more mitigation is undertaken and 
emissions are lower. We also see that in the Nash solution, because there is no 
cooperation, sub-optimal adaptation has little effect on the optimal mitigation path.  In 
the cooperation solutions sub-optimal adaptation has a greater effect as each region 
not only considers that it itself cannot adapt but also the welfare loss from the fact that 
the other regions cannot adapt. The negative externalities of emissions are much 
larger when adaptation is not possible inducing regions to mitigate more when 
cooperating.  










































































Figure 2: Optimal emissions paths for the three cooperation scenarios (Nash, climate 
cooperation and full cooperation) with optimal adaptation  and without adaptation. 
 
 
4.3  Adaptation transfers 
 
In Section 3.3 we showed that financial transfers to fund adaptation in other regions will only 
take place in the cooperative cases. Here we use our numerical model to investigate the 
adaptation transfer magnitudes and directions in the more elaborate setting with multiple 
heterogeneous regions.
13 Comparing the scenarios can give us an idea of which regions, 
according to this model, should receive (give) funding based on their relatively high damages 
and which should receive (give) based on their relatively low incomes.  
In the case of climate cooperation, transfers will flow from low impact to high impact regions 
as shown in the previous section. We look at two cases; in the first case adaptation is set at its 
optimal level, in the second case adaptation expenses is limited in developing countries
14, by 
assuming adaptation expenditures cannot be more than half of what would be optimal. We do 
this as it does not seem likely that optimal adaptation will be attainable in the real world, 
especially so for developing regions (cf. de Bruin and Dellink, 2009). In Figure 3 the total 
amount of adaptation funding is given over time for the climate cooperation case. In the case 
of optimal adaptation, the small levels of financing arise because of the steeply increasing 
adaptation costs, when adaptation is set at its locally optimal level, compensating for 
differences in climate impacts through financing of additional adaptation will be quite costly. 
In the case of limited adaptation in developing countries, transfers will be larger, as more 
cost-effective adaptation options are unused. The amount of funding increases sharply over 
time. Figure 4 presents the regional shares in the adaptation for the host and donor regions 
for the case of optimal and limited adaptation in developing regions. The total amount of 
funding from donors equates the total amount of funding received by hosts. In the case of 
                                                 
13 Clearly, our specification of international cooperation is too stylised to be able to provide numerical 
results that can be used for policy recommendations. Our aim is merely to understand the magnitude 
and direction of flows using our two cooperation scenarios. Clearly, this setting abstracts from issues 
such as historical responsibility for climate change, and cannot be viewed as a policy recommendation 
14 We categorise HIO, MI, LMI, LI, China, India and Africa as developing regions.   13 
optimal adaptation only Russia and China provide funding. Although the two donors of 
adaptation financing may seem counter-intuitive at first sight, their profile fits the solution 
concept used: income differences are irrelevant except for damages caused by climate change. 
Thus, these two regions, that are expected to have relatively low damage levels, will 
compensate regions that are hit more severely by climate change.
 When adaptation in 
developing countries is limited, more funding needs to be provided, and our simulations show 
that Russia, Eastern Europe, Other high income countries and China are the donors in the case 
of climate cooperation. Again, these are the regions with the lowest damages (or highest 
benefits) from climate change. The most vulnerable regions India, Low income countries, 
Low middle income countries, Africa, and Middle income countries receive the most funding.  
Figure 3: Total adaptation transfers to regions in percentage of global GDP for the 































Figure 4: Regional composition of adaptation funding for the case of climate 
cooperation with optimal adaptation and with adaptation expenditures limited to 50% 




Figure 5 and 6 show the adaptation transfers in the case of full cooperation over time. 
Introducing an adaptation fund gives regions a way to transfer money in order to equalise 
marginal utilities across regions. Because in this setting adaptation funding is not only 
                                                 
15 Note that regions with a share of less than 1% in adaptation funding are omitted from the figure.    14 
compensating for climate change damages, but is also used as a development fund, both the 
magnitude of the flows  (cf. Figures 5 and 3) and the division between hosts and donors is 
radically different (cf. Figures 6 and 4). In the full cooperation case we see that the richest 
regions, notably USA, Japan and Other High Income, transfer to the poorest regions, with a 
large part flowing to Africa. Once again these results confirm our insights of Section 3. 
Furthermore, limiting adaptation increases transfers but this increase is very small relative to 
the size of the transfers under optimal adaptation. We see thus that there are huge differences 
between the climate cooperation and full cooperation solutions. As Nordhaus and Yang 
(2006) mention, the full cooperation case is often used to investigate climate change 
cooperation as it easy to implement and justify. In the full cooperation scenario funds will 
stream from high income to low income regions due to differences in marginal utility. One 
can think of this as interconnected reservoirs with different water levels. When the connectors 
are opened, water will flow from high to low levels. An adaptation transfer gives regions a 
way to open these connectors. Applying a full cooperation scenario can therefore be 
misleading from the perspective of a focused climate policy impact analysis as it incorporates 























































































Figure 5: Total adaptation transfers to regions in percentage of global GDP for the 
case of full cooperation. 
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Figure 6: Regional composition of adaptation funding for the case of full cooperation 
with optimal adaptation and with adaptation expenditures limited to 50% of optimal, 
where host regions receive funding and donor regions give funding 
4.4  Transfers and mitigation 
 
Our complex applied model can also be used to investigate a number of mechanisms that 
could not be dealt with in the analytical model. One important issue is that of the effect of 
transfers on mitigation. 
The overall effect of transfers on mitigation can be seen in Figure 7 for the two cooperative 
solutions. We see that emissions increase and thus mitigation decreases considerably in the 
case of full cooperation. In the case of climate cooperation emissions are almost the same, 
implying overlapping lines in the figure. It is logical that the effects are higher in the full 
cooperation scenario, as the transfers too are much higher compared to the climate 
cooperation scenario. The results for the individual regions (omitted here) indicate that 
emissions increase in all regions when adaptation transfers are introduced except in Africa in 
the case of full cooperation. As transfers grow, so does the amount of disposable funds. It is 
most beneficial for Africa to spend these funds on mitigation (even though there is increased 
adaptation) as opposed to other investments, this also due to the externalities of mitigation.  
   










































































Figure 7: Optimal emissions paths for the 3 solution concept (Nash, climate cooperation and 
full cooperation) with and without transfers (with optimal adaptation). 
 
5  Conclusions 
 
This paper investigated two main issues; firstly what is the effect of making adaptation 
explicit in an integrated assessment modeling framework in a multi regional setting. We look 
at three forms of cooperation between regions: Nash (no cooperation), Climate cooperation 
(regional differences in climate change damages are considered) and Full cooperation 
(regional differences in income per capita are considered). We find that explicitly including 
adaptation as a control option, will not affect the resulting mitigation policy outcomes in a 
first best world where adaptation is set at its optimal level, i.e. policies of mitigation and 
adaptation are separable in a multi-regional first best setting. Making adaptation explicit 
makes it possible, however, to study other states of the world. When policies are not optimal, 
mitigation and adaptation can compensate for sub-optimal levels of each other. Here, 
adaptation and mitigation are not separable and sub-optimal adaptation will affect the optimal 
mitigation path. Our numerical model (AD-RICE) shows that the mitigation path can be 
affected considerably. We conclude that the assumption of optimal implicit adaptation needs 
to be reconsidered to create sound mitigation policy conclusions. 
 Secondly this paper aimed to answer questions concerning adaptation transfers. For 
each form of cooperation, we study if transfers will take place and what effects 
adaptation transfers will have on (i) domestic adaptation and (ii) the optimal 
mitigation path. We find that in a first best world foreign adaptation funding will 
crowd out domestic adaptation expenditures. When ensuring that crowding out is not 
possible we see that adaptation transfers will run from low climate change impact 
regions to high climate change impact regions. In the case of full cooperation 
adaptation transfers run from high income to low income regions and serve as a form 
of development assistance, attempting to equalise consumption per capita over regions. 
Transfers are thus much larger in full cooperation than in climate cooperation. We 
also see that transfers increase tremendously when adaptation in limited in developing 
regions. The magnitude and direction of transfers are very different in the different   17 
forms of cooperation. When setting policies, one needs to carefully understand the 
distributional effects and assumptions underlying modelling results. The overall effect 
that adaptation transfers may have on mitigation is dominated by several mechanisms. 
A transfer will increase the budget of the receiving region which may decrease 
emissions (when more is invested in mitigation) or increase emissions (when more is 
invested in capital). A transfer will decrease the budget of donating region, decreasing 
mitigation investments and/or capital investments. As both adaptation and mitigation 
can be used by a low impact region to compensate a high impact region, having the 
new option of an adaptation transfer can therefore also decrease mitigation efforts. In 
the case of climate cooperation, we see that emissions increase slightly. In the case of 
full cooperation, emissions increase by much more. This is because of an over-
investment of adaptation in adaptation funds receiving regions creating low incentives 
to mitigate. 
This study is subject to several limitations. Firstly the model used here is based on the RICE 
model and therefore has the same limitations of that model. It does not consider irreversibility 
and uncertainties and simplifies many relations in the climate and economy. Furthermore, the 
formulation of adaptation in the model is a flow approach, i.e. adaptation is essentially seen as 
reactive. A more elaborate stock-and-flow approach may be able to reflect the anticipatory 
nature of certain types of adaptation measures better. Finally the data used in this study to 
understand the cost and benefits of adaptation is limited due to the general lack of estimates in 
this field. More detailed estimates can give us a better understanding of the issues studied here. 
   
 
 
Appendix A: AD-RICE Model and parameter calibration 
 
 
In this section we describe the AD-RICE model. This model is based on the RICE99 model as 
described in Nordhaus and Boyer (2000), with a revised damage module, which incorporates 
adaptation explicitly.  
The AD-RICE model consists of J regions, where each region is indexed by j=1,2,…J. 
Furthermore, there is a planning period indexed by t=1,2,…T. Each time step is 10 years 







= × ∑ .                         (A.1) 
Where  j W is the welfare over the planning period for each region j . The region specific 
weights are given by j n . Thus the social welfare is given by the sum of the weighted total 
utility of all regions. 
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t R  represents the discount factor which is given by;  
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This is the population weighted natural logarithm of consumption per capita, i.e. total 
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Output is a Cobb Douglas function of capital , j t K , labour ( , j t L ) and energy services from 
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Where  , j t W  is the change damage factor and  ,
E
j t c  are the costs of carbon energy, these depend 
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Carbon services are linked to emissions ( , j t E ):  
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Where 
, ,0 , exp( )
A A A
j t j j t g g = × -¶ .                                 (A.14) 
 
The consumption function is given by: 
 
, , , j t j t j t C Y I = -                         (A.15) 
 
Capital accumulation is defined as: 
, 1 , , , (1 ) j t k j j t j t K K I d + = - + .                     (A.16) 
 
Where  , k j d  is the depreciation rate and  , j t I  the investments in capital. Furthermore it is 
assumed that capital is immobile between regions.  
The first period capital is given: 
*
,0 j j K K =                          (A.17) 
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Where 
   20 
, ,0 (1 )
t
j t j l LU LU d = × - .                                        (A.20) 
 
Cumulative emissions are given as: 
 
1 t t t CumC CumC E + = + .                                (A.21) 
The market price of carbon energy depends on the cumulative industrial emissions: 
3 *
1 2 [ / ] t t q CumC CumC
x x x = + × .                   (A.22) 
Initial atmospheric concentrations are given: 
*
,0 AT AT M M = .                        (A.23) 
Atmospheric carbon concentrations depend on previous concentrations in the atmosphere and 
upper oceans and on total emissions: 
  
, 1 11 , 1 21 , 1 AT t t AT t UP t M ET M M f f - - - = + + .                              (A.24) 
 
Carbon concentrations in the upper oceans depend on previous concentrations in the 
atmosphere, upper oceans and lower oceans; 
 
, 22 , 1 12 , 1 32 , 1 UP t UP t AT t LO t M M M M f f f - - - = + + .                 (A.25) 
 
Initial carbon concentration in the upper oceans is given: 
 
*
,0 UP UP M M = .                                
(A.26)   
Carbon concentrations in the lower oceans depend on previous concentrations in the upper 
oceans and lower oceans; 
 
, 33 , 1 23 , 1 LO t LO t UP t M M M f f - - = + .                   (A.27) 
 
Initial carbon concentration in the lower oceans is given:   21 
*
,0 LO LO M M = .                         (A.28) 
Radiative forcing ( t F ) is a function of the ratio of atmospheric concentrations to pre-
industrial atmospheric concentrations of carbon ( /
PI
AT AT M M    ) plus exogenous radiative 
forcing growth ( t O ). 
  { } log / /log(2)
PI
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Temperature change compared to pre-industrial level is given as: 
{ } 1 1 1 2 1 , 1 t t t t t LO t T T F T T T s l s - - - -   = + × - × - × -                  (A.31) 
Where  , LO t T  is the lower ocean temperature. 
Initial temperature change is given: 
*
0 T T = .                         (A.32) 
Lower ocean temperature depends on previous period temperature in the lower ocean and 
atmosphere. 
, , 1 1 , 1 LO t LO t t LO t T T T T - - -   = + -                        (A.33) 
Initial temperature change is given: 
 
*
,0 LO LO T T =                                     (A.34) 









                        (A.35) 
, j t D  is the damage due to climate change and is given as a function of temperature change in 
the atmosphere. 
We define gross damages of climate change as a percentage of output ( t j GD , ) as a function 




j t j t j t GD T T
b b b = +                      (A.37)   22 
The residual damages of climate change are the damages after adaptation to climate change 
has taken place. Regions can change economic, social and cultural structures to decrease the 
damages or increase benefits of climate change in their region, that is adapt. Residual 
damages as a percentage of output ( , j t RD ) are a function of adaptation ( t j P , and , j t PR ) and 
gross damages ( t j GD , ), where  , , (0 1) j t j t P P £ ³  represents the fraction by which gross 
damages are reduced and , , (0 1) j t j t PR PR £ ³  represents the fraction by which gross benefits 
are increased, this is given in equation A.38. 
, , , ,
, , , ,
(1 ) 0
(1 ) 0
j t j t j t j t
j t j t j t j t
RD P GD GD
RD PR GD GD
= - × >
= - × <
                                                     (A.38) 
Adaptation comes at a cost though; the adaptation costs as a function of output ( , j t PC ) are 
the costs of adaptation. The cost function is a function of t j P ,  and , j t PR  . Where the 
coefficients are j , 1 g and j , 2 g  are different across regions, furthermore  0 , 1 > j g  and 1 , 2 > j g : 
2,
, 1, , , ( )
j
j t j j t j t PC P PR
g g = × + .                     (A.39) 
Finally: 
, , , j t j t j t D RD PC = +                                                                   (A.40) 
The residual damages together with the adaptation costs form the net climate change damages 
defined as  , j t D  in the original RICE model. Furthermore the residual damages, the adaptation 
costs and mitigation costs together represent the total costs of climate 
change , , , , (( ) ) j t j t j t j t RD PC MC Y + + × .  
In the model the regions can choose different levels of consumption, capital investment, 
mitigation and adaptation to fulfil their objectives.  
The calibrated parameter values for equations A.37 and A.39 are given in table A1.   23 
 
Table A1: Parameter values from AD-RICE in the optimal scenario calibration. 
 
1 b   2 b   3 b   1 g   2 g  
JAPAN  -0.0028  0.0012  2.65  0.031  3.26 
USA  -0.0010  0.0004  4.06  0.016  10.21 
EUROPE  -0.0002  0.0046  2.29  0.341  4.24 
HIO  -  0.0070  1.53  0.315  5.19 
MI  -  0.00587  1.49  0.216  3.97 
LMI  -  0.00571  1.85  0.332  5.06 
LI  -  0.01091  1.55  0.502  5.18 
CHINA  -0.0022  0.00064  2.97  0.0225  6.29 
INDIA  -  0.01512  1.70  0.783  5.28 
AFRICA  -  0.02152  1.21  0.751  5.12 
 
 
Appendix B: Optimal mitigation levels 
 
In  the  following  we  derive  the  optimal  levels  of  mitigation  for  the  different  model 
specifications as described in Section 3.  
 
B.1. Application to the model with implicit adaptation 
 
The  simplest  specification,  with  implicit  adaptation  can  be  solved  using  the  Pontryagin 
maximum principle (Pontryagin 1962) for a dynamic optimisation problem with 1 control 
variable, mitigation (m ), and a state variable, total cumulative emissions (M ). Although our 
problem includes multiple regions, we omit regional subscripts here as we derive the Nash 
solution. In this case each region optimises only its own consumption given the level of 
emissions by the other players.  













× + ∑ .                   (A.41) 
Subject to the following equation of motion and start value of the state variable. 
1 ( ) t t t M M f m + - =                        (A.42)   24 
1 M M =                          (A.43) 
 
Using  the  Pontryagin  maximum  principle,  the  corresponding  discrete  time  current  value 
Hamiltonian is:  
 
1 1 ( , , ) (.) (.) t t t t t H M V f m l r l + + = + ×                     (A.44) 
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The value function is simply the instantaneous utility function, which in our simple model 
diminishes to consumption as the residual of income after climate costs (damages and 
mitigation costs): 
2,
1, ( , )
t
t t t t t t t t V M Y M Y Y
q m j q m = - × × - × × .                              (A.48) 
 
 Furthermore the equation of motion is given by the build-up of the stock of CO2 over time, 
which depends on emissions after mitigation: 
( ) (1 ) t t t t f Y Ex m m = W× × - + .                                           (A.49) 
 
Where Ex is are exogenous emissions (emissions from other players). 
 













,                                                                    (A.50) 
 
i.e. the impact of CO2 stocks beyond the model horizon are not taken into account (which is 
not a major problem if the model horizon is sufficiently long). 
The first order conditions then result in:   25 
1 (1 ) t t t t t M M Y Ex m + = +W× - +                               (A.51) 
1 t t t t Y r l l j + × - = ×                                   (A.52) 
2, 1
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q q q m r l
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where the asterix refers to the optimal levels. 
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B.2. Application to the model with explicit adaptation 
 
Here we present the optimal level of mitigation and adaptation for the case where we include 
an explicit adaptation variable.
16  
The value function now includes adaptation efforts,P , as an additional control variable and 
adaptation costs as a competing claim to income;  
 
2, 2
1 1, 1 ( , , ) (1 )
t
t t t t t t t t t t t t V P M Y M Y P Y P Y
q g m w q m g = - × × × - - × × - × ×  .                     (A.57) 
 
The equation of motion is still given by equation A.49: 
 
( ) (1 ) t t t t f Y Ex m m = W× × - + .             
                                                 
16 Again we omit regional subscripts as we are calculating the Nash solution.   26 
 
The first order conditions of the maximum principle (A.51) and (A.53)  and condition (A.50) 
are unchanged, A.52 changes into A.58; 
1 (1 ) t t t t t Y P r l l w + × - = × × - .                               (A.58) 
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These conditions result in: 
1 (1 ) t t t t t Y P r l l w + × - = × × -                                (A.60) 
2 1
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Using  1 0 T l + =  and solving recursively, we can express  t l  as follows: 
 
( )





Y P l w r
=
= - × × - × ∑ .                              (A.64) 
 
Substituting (A.64) in (A.54) yields the optimal level of mitigation with explicit adaptation; 

































Appendix C: Cooperative solutions with transfers 
 
When introducing transfers we no longer use the level of adaptation as a decision variable but 
use the level of adaptation costs instead. Since these two variables are linked directly this will 
not change the solution but is needed to ensure that transfers are spent on adaptation. 
In its most simple form the problem can be solved for 2 regions ( D  and  H ) using the 
Pontryagin maximum principle (Pontryagin 1962) for a dynamic optimisation problem with 5 
control  variable,  mitigation  for  each  region  ( , D H m m ),  adaptation  costs  for  each  region  
( , D H PC PC )  and  an  adaptation  transfers  from D  to  H (TA )  and  a  state  variable,  total 
cumulative emissions (M ).  
In the dynamic solution the regions maximizes: 
1 , , , , 1
1
( , , , , , ) ( ) T
T
t D t H t D t H t t t T
t
V PC PC TA M F M r m m r + +
=
× + ∑ .             (A.66) 
 
Subject to the following equation of motion and start value of the state variable as in 
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Using  the  Pontryagin  maximum  principle  the  corresponding  discrete  time  current  value 
Hamiltonian is:  
, , , , 1 1 ( , , , , , , ) (.) (.) D t H t D t H t t t t t H PC PC TA M V f m m l r l + + = + ×              (A.67) 
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(A.73) 
 
 Furthermore the equation of motion is given by the build-up of the stock of CO2 over time, 
which depends on emissions after mitigation: 
, , , , , , ( , ) (1 ) (1 ) D t H t D D t D t H H t H t f Y Y m m m m = W × × - +W × × - .             (A.74) 













                            
i.e. the impact of CO2 stocks beyond the model horizon are not taken into account (which is 
not a major problem if the model horizon is sufficiently long).   29 
The first order condition (A.45) then result in: 
1 , , , , (1 ) (1 ) t t D D t D t H H t H t M M Y Y m m + = +W × × - +W × × -               (A.75) 
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The first order condition (A.68) then result in: 
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The corresponding optimal level of  t TA is given by rewriting (A.82): 
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Appendix D. Proofs 
 
Proof of Proposition 1. To proof that making adaptation explicit in the optimum will have no 
effect on the optimal levels of mitigation; we need to show that the optimal level of mitigation 
can be expressed in only terms of mitigation and exogenous parameters. 
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. 
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Since we assume that  1 M M = ( A.43) and  1 , , (1 ) t t j j t j t t M M Y Ex m + = +W × - +  (A.51) 
and t Ex is given, we can find the optimal mitigation path through forward induction. Thus  t M  
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and therefore mitigation can be expressed in exogenous parameters and mitigation as follows 
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Proof of Proposition 2a. To proof that foreign adaptation funding will fully crowd out 
domestic adaptation funding, we will show that when host adaptation expenditures are set at 
their optimal levels, the derivative of PC to TA is -1.  
When introducing an adaptation transfer to region P, the optimal level of adaptation 
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Thus for every additional dollar of foreign funding, domestic adaptation expenditure will 
decrease by one dollar. 
 
Proof of Proposition 2b. To proof that adaptation will not be crowded out when 
*
, , ( ) H t t F H t PC TA PC P + <  we have to show that the marginal benefits of adaptation will 
exceed or equal the marginal costs at that point, i.e. given that level of adaptation transfers. 
We will prove that for 
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, , ( ) H t t F H t PC TA PC P + <  must hold. To 
prove this we assume the contrary;  
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Which is a contradiction, which proves that 
*
, , ( ) H t t F H t PC TA PC P + <  must hold for  
, ,
H H










Proof of Proposition 3a. To proof that adaptation transfers will not take place in the 
competitive Nash equilibrium, we show that the optimal transfer is zero when optimising the 
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where 1 n , 2 n  are the welfare weights. These are equal to the inverse of the marginal utility of 
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When adaptation expenditures are set at the internally optimal levels in region P,  , H t PC , will 
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Proof of Proposition 3b. We prove that adaptation transfers will be positive in the case of 
climate cooperation when there are differences in impacts across regions and transfers will 
run from low impact to high impact regions. We show that using the climate cooperation 
welfare weight, transfers indeed will take place when there are differences in impacts and run 
from low to high impact regions.  
The SWF is now maximised using the welfare weights in the case that there are no damages 
from climate change. The logic here is that countries should receive the same weight as they 
would have in the competitive equilibrium when climate change did not occur. The welfare 
weights equal the inverse of the marginal utility of consumption when there are no damages 
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When adaptation expenditures are set at the internal optimal levels in region H, , H t PC  will be 
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. This is only the case if
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D t H t
D t H t
Y Y
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< . This entails that the negative effects of 
climate change (the damages) are lower in region R.  
 
 
Proof of Proposition 3c. We prove that adaptation transfers will take place when global 
utility is maximised when there are differences between income consumption levels across 
regions and that transfers will run from high income regions to low income regions. To do 
this we show that when using equal welfare weights this is the case.  
 When global utility is maximised the welfare weights take the value of 1 for all regions. 
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When adaptation expenditures are set at the internally optimal levels in region H, , P t PC  will 
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